Two Ossipee police officers were in the Town of Madison when they observed a vehicle operating dangerously. They radioed for a sheriff’s deputy or state trooper, but finally stopped the vehicle when they observed it almost collide with another vehicle. A state trooper arrived and charged Michael J. Smith with driving while intoxicated.
During booking, Smith was found to be in possession of prescription medications and was indicted on those charges. At the trial court, Smith moved to suppress the evidence of illegal drug possession, challenging the constitutionality of the stop made by the Ossipee officers outside their jurisdiction. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding that exigent circumstances existed to authorize the stop even though Ossipee and Madison had no mutual aid agreement granting authority to the Ossipee officers in Madison.
Smith was convicted on five felony counts of illegal possession of a controlled drug. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the Ossipee officers violated RSA 105:4, which grants selectmen authority to employ police officers for the detection and conviction of criminals “in their town,” and RSA 105:13, which grants police officers authority to render assistance in a town with which their police department has a mutual aid agreement. Smith argued that evidence obtained as the result of an illegal stop should be excluded when the provisions of RSA Chapter 105 are violated.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed, affirming the trial court decision to deny the motion to suppress, although for different reasons. Smith had argued that RSA 106-B:15, which defines the territorial jurisdiction of the state police, specifically provides that evidence shall not be excluded when a trooper fails to comply with jurisdictional limits of the statute as long as the trooper is acting in good faith. Since RSA Chapter 105 does not include a similar provision, Smith argued, evidence obtained as the result of municipal police officers acting outside their jurisdiction in the absence of a mutual aid agreement should be suppressed.
The Supreme Court disagreed. “There is no language in RSA [C]hapter 105 to indicate that the legislature intended to authorize suppression as a remedy,” the Court wrote, adding, that there was no evidence that, by failing to include a provision similar to the statute involving state troopers, the legislature “intended a different result when a town officer acts outside of his jurisdictional limit.”
Smith also argued that the stop by the Ossipee officers violated his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the state and federal constitutions. He claimed that because the officers were operating outside their jurisdiction they could not have obtained a warrant. The trial court had held that exigent circumstances permitted the officers to make the stop without a warrant, but the Supreme Court said a warrant wasn’t required at all because the Ossipee police not only had a reasonable suspicion to stop Smith but had probable cause as well. They witnessed Smith’s vehicle cross the yellow line, drive off the road, run a stop sign and “nearly collide with an oncoming vehicle.” In addition, the state trooper arrived no more than 10 minutes after the Ossipee police detained Smith. The Court wrote, “Suppression is not mandated when one’s constitutional rights are not violated. Here, the Ossipee police officers made a constitutionally valid traffic stop.”
In addition, the Court noted, “[T]he stop lasted no longer than necessary when judged in terms of its purpose.” The Court cited other state and federal court decisions that supported its conclusion that the Ossipee officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop Smith even though they were outside their territorial jurisdiction.